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Clearly  our  political  and  military  role  in world  affairs  needs  re-
assessing.  Clearly  a  lot of  people  and  a  lot of  members  of Congress
are  unhappy  with  it-unhappy  with  the  way  the  war  in  Vietnam  is
going,  unhappy  with  our  inability  to  do  anything  about the  invasion
of  Czechoslovakia,  unhappy  about  the  sad  state  of NATO,  unhappy
about  the explosive  confrontation  in  the Middle  East,  unhappy about
the  division  of  priorities  between  our  role  in the world  and  our  cry-
ing  needs  at  home.  A  lot  of  people  wonder  whether  we  have  our
priorities  straight  in  our  minds,  whether  we  are  really  dealing  with
first things  first.
Mr.  Nixon  says  that  the  answer  for  all  this  is  new  leadership,
and  so,  for  that  matter,  does Vice  President  Humphrey.  We  are  go-
ing to get new  leadership  and the  question  is  whether,  with new lead-
ers,  we  are  going  to  get  radically  new  policies.  That  is what I would
like  to talk about-the  opportunities  and  the  limitations  on new for-
eign  policies  that  await  any  new  President  seeking  first  to  reassess
and then  to reorder  the  role of  the United  States in  world  affairs.
The era  of  Lyndon  B.  Johnson  is  over.  Between  now  and  Janu-
ary 20 there will of course be developments  abroad which will engage
President  Johnson's  attention.  There  may  be  major  initiatives  from
the  President  himself-a  last ditch  effort  to  meet  with  the Russians
in  an  attempt  to  at  least  begin  negotiations  on  new  arms  control
measures.  I  would  not  exclude  a  complete  halt  in  the  bombing  in
North Vietnam,  in  an effort to  get really  substantive negotiations  go-
ing  before  election  day.  But  these  would  be  no  more  than  logical
extensions  of what President  Johnson  has been  trying to do for  some
months-indeed  for  several  years.  For  good  or  bad,  the  Johnson
record  has been  very  largely  written.  The  evidence  of  this  is  in  one
of the less publicized  activities now under way in Washington:  a con-
certed effort,  government-wide,  to pull  together  the  record,  to  collect
the  papers  and  the  documents  and the  cables,  and  to  try  to  arrange
the  history  of  this  administration  in foreign  affairs,  before  the  his-
torians  get  at it.
This  is  a particularly  appropriate  time  to  reassess  our  role in the
world  because  we  are,  in  a  sense,  in  a  state  of  suspended  animation
51and  indeed  really  have  been  since  the  31st of  March,  when  the  be-
ginning  of  the  end  of  the  Johnson  era  was  proclaimed  by  the  Presi-
dent's  withdrawal  as  a  candidate  to  succeed  himself.  More  than that
we  are,  I  strongly  suspect,  at  one  of those  curious  turning  points in
the  evolution  of  our  foreign  affairs  that  are  not  recognized  at  the
time  and  are  not  even  necessarily  recognizable  as  such  except  in  a
much longer  perspective,  with  the  benefit  of  hindsight.  The two  con-
ventions could  have made this turning point much more dramatic,  of
course, if they had nominated,  let us say Nelson Rockefeller  in Miami,
or Eugene  McCarthy  or Senator  Edward Kennedy  or,  if Fate had  not
intervened,  Senator  Robert Kennedy.
There  is  going  to  be  change,  nevertheless,  and  the  reason  may
have less  to  do with the  identity of the  two leading  candidates  than  it
has to  do with  the state of the  world  and with  what has already  been
done within  a very brief period  by  President  Johnson  himself.  It  also
has  to  do with  such  intangibles  as  the  mood of the American  people
and  the  political  tide  which  seems  to  be  flowing  toward  more  con-
servatism,  toward  less  foreign  entanglement,  toward  a  more  modest
role,  all  around,  for the  federal  government,  toward states'  rights and
local options.
There  is  an  inward turning,  encouraged  by the  urgency  of prob-
lems  at  home,  by  the  revolt  of  the  youth  and  the  disadvantaged.
There is  a general  feeling that like  a ship battered  by storm  we ought
to return  to port and refit  before  setting forth  to tackle  the problems
of  the  world  on  anything  like  the  scale  we  have  been  attempting  in
the postwar  period.
Many  things  are  contributing  to  these  changes  in  collective  atti-
tudes, and  it is  not  necessary  to identify  all of them in order to  make
the  central  point  that  we  are  confronting  a  period  of  change.  It  is
necessary,  in  fact,  to  examine  only  one  element-the  touchstone  of
our  current  foreign  policy,  the central  issue,  the chief determinant  of
where  we  are  going,  the  war  in Vietnam.  The main  reason  it  seems
reasonable  to  predict major  changes  in our role in  the world,  regard-
less  of  who  the  next  President  is,  can  be  found  in  the  simple  fact
that  we have  already  made  a major  strategic  change  in how  we  have
been  conducting  the  war  in  Vietnam.  This change  inevitably  and  in-
exorably  will  force  upon  the  next  President  even  more  fundamental
revision  of our objectives  and our  policy in  Vietnam  and  all over the
world,  in  all  the places  where  new Vietnams  could occur.
Presidents  have  a natural  tendency  to conceal  this  sort of  thing.
They  abhor  the  suggestion  that they  have  changed  anything because
this  implies  error;  it suggests  that what  they  were  doing  was  wrong.
52But  in  a  certain  basic,  irrevocable  sense,  President  Johnson  last
March  and  April  changed  everything  in  Vietnam.
It came  about,  I  would  argue,  in  the  conjunction  of  two  events.
One  was the  Tet  offensive  in Vietnam.  The  other  was  the  first  Presi-
dential  primary,  in  New  Hampshire.  The  first proved both the  limits
of  what  we  could  hope  to  achieve  by  a  restrained  use  of  military
force  and  the  limits  of  what  the  enemy  could  achieve.  It  is  idle  to
argue  who  won.  Nobody  won.  That  is  the  point.  The  enemy showed
that  they could create  an  enormous  amount of havoc  at an enormous
price.  We  showed  that we  could  withstand  this but that  we  probably
could  not prevent  it  from  happening  again  if  the  enemy  is  prepared
to  pay the  price.
So  the  futility  of  trying  to  win  in  the  old  conventional  way  was
demonstrated,  and  with it our vulnerability  as  well  as  that of the  ene-
my.  What  was  also  demonstrated  was  the  inevitability  that  a  nego-
tiated,  compromise  settlement  is  the  only  way  out  short of  escalation
and  full  mobilization  for  a  war  effort  whose  outcome  would  be  still
less  certain.  The  effect  of  this,  I  feel  certain,  was  profound  in  New
Hampshire  and  contributed  mightily  to  the  success  there  of Senator
McCarthy.  This,  in  turn,  set  up  the  prospect of  an  outright  McCar-
thy victory over  President Johnson  in Wisconsin.  On March  31,  1968,
Lyndon  Johnson,  who  had  only  narrowly  escaped  defeat  in  New
Hampshire,  faced  the  almost  certain  prospect  of  defeat  and  further
humiliation  in Wisconsin.
The  interaction  of  these  two  widely  separate  events-a  great
enemy  rampage  in  Vietnam  and  the  primaries  at  home-may  not
literally  have  persuaded  President  Johnson  to  withdraw.  But  these
two  events  certainly  shaped  both  the  timing  and  the  manner  of  his
withdrawal  for  together  they  helped  reinforce  the  view  among  his
advisors  that  the  President  could  not  win  in  Vietnam,  or  with  the
American  public,  by pursuing  his  current  course.
So  the  President  changed  his  strategy.  One  result  was  the  peace
initiative,  announced  on  March  31,  along  with  the  President's  in-
tention  of  withdrawing  as  a  candidate  to  succeed  himself,  and  fea-
turing  the  partial  bombing  pause  and  the  call  for  peace  talks.  It
was  apparently  the  President's  considered  view  that  the  latter  two
initiatives  could  not  succeed  unless  they were  coupled  with  his  own
retirement  as  a  contender  for  the  Presidency.  These  were  the  out-
ward  changes.  But  much the most  important change  was never  really
acknowledged.  In fact,  it  was  denied-it  was  a non-happening.  But
it happened.  The  President  decided  not to  grant  General  Westmore-
land's  request  for  an  additional  206,000  soldiers  for  Vietnam.  It is
53difficult  to  overestimate  the  significance  of  this  decision  for  what  it
said  was  that  the  whole  concept  of  applying graduated  military  pres-
sure  until the  enemy buckled  had not  worked  and could not be made
to  work.  It  was  the  difference  in  a  poker game  between  raising  and
calling.  It  was  a  decision  to  play  for  something  much  more  like  a
stalemate  or a standoff  than  a military  victory.
The  critical  point  is  that  by  putting  this  limit  on  what  we  can
do in  Vietnam,  the  government  put  a limit  of sorts  on  what  we  can
honestly  hope  to  do  any  place.  It  restored  to  the  forefront  of  our
calculations  what had  been  an  element  all along-the  acceptance  of
the hard fact that we  can do only so  much for a small country  which
will only  do  so much  for  itself.
When  President  Johnson  finally  decided  that  the  risk  had  to  be
taken, that the  burden had  to  be  shifted,  that the United  States  could
not  continue  expanding  its effort,  he  finally and  probably  irreversibly
confirmed  the  application to Vietnam  of the  concept of limited war-
a concept  which  was  preached  by administration  officials,  off and  on,
and practiced,  off and on, but never really acknowledged  candidly  be-
cause it had never been an easy concept  to sell to  an American  public
accustomed  to  winning  cleanly  and  completely.  Even  in  Korea,  we
restored  the  status  quo  ante;  we  pushed  the enemy  back  behind  the
original  line.
A case  can be  made that the much more recent events  in Czecho-
slovakia established  some  sort of limit,  too. But that limit was already
there;  however  powerfully  we  might be  drawn out  of emotion  to the
side  of  the  Czechs,  the  limits  on  what  we  could  do  for  them  were
long  ago  fixed.  These  limits  were  fixed  in  Hungary,  in  Poland,  and
in  the  case  of  East  Germany,  where  we  might  have  used  our  influ-
ence  or  our  arms-where  we  might  have  reverted  to  the  old  "roll-
back"  theory  of  the  early  1950's-and  we  did  not.  Neither  did
NATO,  for  the  very  simple  reason  that NATO  was  never  set up  to
do  that kind of  thing.
Still,  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Czechoslovakia  is  another  reminder
of  the  limits  of  power  in  the  age  of  the  nuclear  standoff  where  a
balance  of  terror,  however  awesome,  is  pretty  generally  regarded  as
the  safest,  if  that  is  the  word,  guarantor  of peace.  So,  for  perhaps  a
variety  of  reasons,  some  foreign  and  some  closer  to  home,  it  seems
fair to say  that  we  are  on the front edge  of some  kind of  a new era,
something  markedly  different  whether  it is  called neo-isolationism  or
disengagement  or  whatever.  It will  be  different  in part  for the  fact
that  the  next  President  will  not  be  Lyndon  B.  Johnson,  whose  style
and  method  and  approach  in  the  field  of  foreign  policy  is probably
54very nearly  unique.  It  will be  different  because  there  is  a new  mood
in the country.  Most  of all, it  will be  different because  Lyndon  John-
son,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  has  already  taken  the  crucial  step,  in
the  crucial  corner  of the  world,  that  was necessary  to point the  Viet-
nam  struggle  in  a  new  direction-a  direction  which  neither  of  the
two  major candidates  seems  likely  to want,  or  to be  able,  to  reverse.
It  is  relatively  easy  to  say  that  the  approach  will  be  different.
It gets  a  little  harder to  predict with  any precision  what this different
approach  will be.
The  next  President  will  not  have  the  same  sort of  deep  personal
commitment  to Vietnam  that  President  Johnson  had-the  same per-
sonal  and  political  prestige  at  stake.  A  President  Nixon  would  have
it  a  great  deal  less  than  a President  Humphrey.  Mr.  Humphrey  has
stoutly  defended  the  steady  buildup  of  American  combat  forces
which  started  with  the  landing  of  3,500  marines  in  March  of  1965.
He  has  been  out  in front  of  the  President  in  defense  of  our  obliga-
tions  in  Southeast  Asia  and  the  relationship  between  these  and  our
obligations  around  the  world.
He  is  a  loyal,  not to  say  ebullient,  deputy.  But  it is  also  perfectly
clear  that he  would  like to  draw  a very  clear  distinction  between  be-
ing  a  deputy  and  being  his  own  man,  as  he  made  apparent  in  his
acceptance  speech  at Chicago.  Now he  is  already  projecting  the  first
withdrawal  of  American  combat  troops  late  this  year  or  early  in
1969.  Without  getting  into  an  endless  and infinitely  complicated  dis-
cussion  over  settlement  terms,  it  is pretty  obvious  that Hubert  Hum-
phrey  would  be  a  reasonably  and  relatively  generous  negotiator  in
pursuit  of  a  compromise  that  would  end  the  war  without  clearly
and  blatantly  leaving  South  Vietnam  to  the  certain  fate  of  a  Com-
munist  take-over.  He  rests  his  hopes,  as  does  President  Johnson,  on
the  theory  that  a  progressive  reduction  of  our  effort  will  stimulate
a  progressive  increase  in  the  performance  and  the  capacity  of  the
South Vietnamese  to  carry  a larger share  of  the  load.
Mr. Nixon  has been less  explicit.  But in  one magnificently  honed
phrase  he  has  said  a lot,  "We  shall  end the  war  in Vietnam  and win
the  peace  in  the  Pacific." Note  the  word  "end"  rather  than  "win"
and  note  also  the  reference  to  winning  the  peace  in  "the  Pacific"
rather  than  "Vietnam."  Walter  Lippmann  could  live  with  that  and
so,  with  a little  stretching  could  General  LeMay.  But Nixon's  mean-
ing  is  not  all  that  obscure.  He  has  said privately  that  no President
coming  into  office  in  early  1969  could  hope  to  govern  effectively
unless  he  is  somehow  able  to  move  Vietnam  dramatically  toward  a
settlement,  if not actually  settle  the war,  within six months. My  own
55guess  is  that  Humphrey  will feel  somewhat  the  same  compulsion.
Yet,  it  is  idle  to  speculate  about  some  new  emerging  American
role  in  world  affairs  without  taking  somewhat  into  account  the  ca-
pacity  of  events  to  change  everything-to  upset  everybody's  time-
table.  It was,  after  all,  events-a Communist insurgency  in Greece,  a
Communist  threat  to  all  of  Western  Europe-that  launched  the
whole  postwar  anti-Communist  crusade  and  gave  rise  to  the Truman
Doctrine  with  its sweeping  catch-all  pledge on the  part of the United
States  "to  support  free  peoples  who  are  resisting  attempted  subjuga-
tion  by  armed  minorities  or  by  outside  pressures."  With  significant
variations,  this  has  been  the  bedrock  of  policy  through  Truman  and
Eisenhower  and  Kennedy  and  Johnson.  Some  have  interpreted  it
more  broadly  than  others.  It  has  been  applied  in  a variety  of  ways.
But  Lyndon  Johnson  still  leans  on  the  Truman  Doctrine  as  a  vital
underpinning  of  policy  in  Vietnam.
In  recent  months,  the Truman  Doctrine  and  all  that  came  after
it,  the  pacts  and  the  charters  and  the  proclamations  for  Europe  and
Asia  and  the Middle  East,  have  seemed  increasingly  out of date.  In-
deed,  going  back further than  just the recent  past,  President Kennedy
really  began  the  talk of  a  different  kind  of obligation  on  the part  of
the  United  States-the  more  limited  obligation  to  keep  the  world
safe  for  diversity.  Non-Communism began  to  replace  anti-Commu-
nism  as  our  goal.  There  was  the  test  ban  treaty  and  then  the  non-
proliferation  treaty  now  awaiting  action  in  Congress.  There  were
other  signs  of thaw in the  Cold War-enough  of them so that Hubert
Humphrey  felt  free  in  July  to  talk  about  a  "waning"  of  the  Cold
War,  a  prospect  of  "further  accelerating  mutual  efforts  toward  dis-
armament."  "The  Communist  countries  no  longer  pose  a  monolithic
threat,"  he  said just two months  ago.  He  also noted  a new generation
in  the  United  States  which  rejects  the  "old  premises  of  war  and
diplomacy  and  which  wants  to  see  more  emphasis  placed  on  human
and personal  values."
These  conditions,  he  said,  demand  "a  shift from policies  of  con-
frontation  and containment  to  policies  of reconciliation  and  peaceful
engagement."
In Miami  Beach  a month later,  Mr.  Nixon  observed  in  strikingly
similar  language  that  "the  era of confrontation"  is turning  to  "an  era
of negotiations  with  the  Soviet  Union."  He  had  not changed,  he  in-
sisted,  but  the  world  had  changed  from  the  time  that  he  made  his
1960  acceptance  speech  in  Chicago  and  demanded  a  "strategy  of
victory  for  the  free  world,"  "an  offensive  for  peace  and  freedom,"
and "ideological  striking  force"  to  take  "the  initiative  from  the  Com-
munists."
56Then  came  the  Soviet  tanks  together  with  those  of their Warsaw
Pact  allies  rolling  into  Czechoslovakia  and  you  had  to  ask  yourself
what  about  this  monolith?  What  about  this  new  era of  conciliation
or  negotiation  or  reconciliation?  The  answer  is  that  certainly  noth-
ing  is  going  to  happen  very  quickly.  Not Nixon,  and not Humphrey,
but  the  Russians-and  the  Chinese-will  control  the  pace,  or  have
a lot  to  say about it.
In  the  same  way  the  North  Vietnamese  will  have  something  to
say  about peace  in  Vietnam.  If we have  indeed  abandoned  once  and
for  all  the  dream  that  one  side  can  settle  this,  we  must  in  all  logic
accept  the  fact that it  will  take some  community  of  interest  between
the  two  sides,  some  mutual  acceptance  of  the  need  to compromise.
So the role of  the United  States  in world  affairs  is not something
that  can  be  fixed  immutably  in Washington.  Still  less  can  it be  fixed
in the  White House.  While  Mr.  Nixon has proposed  a  whole new  ap-
proach  to  foreign  aid  and  Mr.  Humphrey  has  urged  that  it  be  in-
creased,  they  both  seem  to  agree,  at least,  that foreign aid  is  a  useful
thing-but  there  is  not  much  sentiment  of  that  sort  in  Congress,
where  the  program  has been  all  but  dismembered  this  year.
In  short,  there  are  crosscurrents  which  will  shape  our  role  in
international  affairs.  There  is  a conservatism  about  spending  money
for the vital necessities  of uplifting underdeveloped  parts of the world
in the interests  of trying to innoculate  them from  the kind of instabil-
ity  that causes  Vietnams.  At the same time  there is,  in Congress,  and
in  the Pentagon,  a cheerful  readiness  to spend  any  amount  of money
for  anything  new and shiny  that promises  us  some  gossamer  strategic
advantage  over  the  Soviet  Union,  measured  in megatonnage.
This  is  a  curious  state  of  mind,  most  effectively  dealt  with  by
former  Secretary  of  Defense  McNamara,  who  has  tried  harder  than
anybody  to argue  the  case against  an overwhelming  nuclear superior-
ity  for  either  us  or  the  Soviets.  When  both  sides  have  the  capacity
to destroy  each  other,  there  is not  a lot to be  said for either  one  hav-
ing  the  capacity  to  do  it over  again.  There  are  outstanding  commit-
ments,  to  SEATO,  to  NATO,  to  Latin  America.  But there  are  also
all  sorts  of  ways  of  interpreting  them,  all  sorts  of  tests  which  put
more  or  less  of  an  onus  on  the beneficiary  of our  help  and  support,
and give  us greater  latitude  for  selectivity.  My hunch  is  that the nat-
ural  inclination  of either Nixon  or Humphrey  will  be to go down  the
road  of careful,  selective,  gradual  disengagement  abroad,  to wind up
the  war  as  rapidly  and honorably  as  possible,  and  to  submit  reason-
ably to what will almost inevitably  be a great upsurge of "never again"
sentiment  in  the  country.
57So  I  foresee  a  shrinking  role  for  the  United  States  in  foreign
affairs-not  a  dramatic  retrenchment,  and  certainly  nothing  like  a
revival  of  isolationism  in  the  old  form.  But  there  will  be  a  turning
inward,  a  new  caution  about  commitments  abroad,  new reservations
about  our  obligation  to  set  things  right  everywhere.  This  is  almost
unmistakably  the  mood  of  the  country.  It  is  reflected  in  the  party
platforms and the campaign  statements  of the candidates.  And it goes
without  saying  that  it  is  a  mood  which  could  be  altered  or  upset
rather  quickly  by  new threats  posed  by  the  Soviet Union  or the  Red
Chinese  or the  men in  Hanoi  to our  security.
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